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ABSTRACT 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
EFFECTS ON GROWTH: THE LONG RUN EVIDANCE FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
By 
 
Md. Shamsul Arif 
 
Trade and better institutional quality play a significant role in growth for developing 
countries in the long run. This research tries to find out the institutional and trade 
policy effects on growth in the long-run in the context of developing countries. Last 
two decades, some developing countries have achieved fast growth due to trade 
openness as well as institutional reform. This research estimated such indicators 
empirically using last three decades data of 58 developing countries. In order to 
estimate coefficient instrumental variable approach adopted and found significant 
effects of institutional indices on growth. Trade policy has effects on growth, but not 
significant. This research also investigated the decadal change in institution variables’ 
effects on trade using instrumental variable and found significant impact on trade. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The accelerated growth in developing countries is a significant improvement in the 
world economic condition. Recent evidence points to a convergence in the growth of 
developing countries since 2000 suggested that developing economies have grown 
rapidly in the last decade.  In fact, sustainable development is not just about growth 
and tapping growth. However, GDP growth helps countries generating the economic 
resources, i.e., increase the size of the pie which finally improves people’s living 
conditions. According to economic literature, GDP growth is for mainly two reasons. 
The first is when countries accumulate resources (including investment in human 
capital and physical capital). The second one is efficient utilization of these resources. 
Technology, institutional framework or geographical characteristic are the key 
determinants of the ways of resource endowment utilization and therefore how a 
country’s GDP growth is accelerated. Various intellectual literature have recognized 
the outcomes of trade in context of utilizing the deeper geographical factor of trade, 
which means that countries that are lands locked and/or far-off from main markets 
tend to trade a smaller amount than those that are not. However, the effects of better 
institutions and trade policy are also determinants to trade more and/or less. Some 
countries with better trade policy tend to trade more. Developing countries which 
have better institutions and countries that trade in a large amount grow faster. There is 
a role of trade policy and institution quality of growth. A number of developing 
countries which grow fast in the last two decades have also been poor countries before 
1980. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
 This research investigates the joint role of institutions and trade on growth 
controlling other factors of growth equation in the long-run for developing 
countries.  
 Do better institution quality lead to economic growth?  
 Is there any relationship between trade policy and economic growth? 
 Is there any change happened in the trade growth while improvements in 
institutions over a decade? 
1.3 Objectives 
 To identify the relationship between GDP growth rate and institutions. 
 To know the relationship between growth rate and trade policy. 
 To capture the change happened in the trade growth while improvements in 
institutions over a decade. 
 To suggest policy implications 
 
1.4 Hypothesis (or claim) 
The null hypothesis and the alternate hypothesis are: 
Hypothesis 1: 
𝐻଴: 𝛽௜=0 (There are no effects of institutional quality and trade policy on GDP growth 
rate in developing countries) 
𝐻ଵ: 𝛽௜≠0 (There are effects of institutional quality and trade policy on GDP growth 
rate in developing countries) 
Hypothesis 2: 
𝐻଴: 𝛽௜=0 (There is a no effect of change in institution on trade over a decade) 
𝐻ଵ: 𝛽௜≠0 (There is an effect of the change in institution on trade over a decade) 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Trade policy (or trade volumes) and institutional quality are one of the discourses in 
growth and development literature. Some scholarly literate, have been provided many 
thoughts to investigate the current research. Frankel and Romer (1999) identified, 
“The geographically determined component of trade as a fraction of GDP exerts a 
strong positive effect on growth in the very long run”. In this research, the researchers 
incorporated trade fraction of GDP in current local currency units as trade variable. 
However, this research excluded trade variable from the research while using trade 
predicted by the gravity model as an instrument. 
 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) analyze, “The historically determined 
component of current institutional quality exerts strong effects on development in a 
similar framework.” Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) demonstrate that 
institutional quality has a very large impact on long-run growth.  These two 
researchers included institutional variables (risk of appropriation) but excluded trade 
variable while using “settler mortality” as an instrument. Researchers try to reveal the 
historical component (colonization) can play a role on the institution as well as 
growth.  
Alcala and Ciccone (2002) estimated, “A variety of regression of GDP per worker on 
trade as a share of GDP and measures of institutional quality”.  In this research, both 
trade and institutional variable are included using instruments as population, log 
(population), area, trade predicted by gravity model, log (trade predicted by gravity 
model), fraction of the population speaking English, fraction of the population 
speaking major European language. This research included Real GDP per Worker at 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 1985 as a dependent variable to focus on labor 
productivity. 
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Cheptea (2007) empirically investigates that trade liberalization effects on domestic 
institution in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Countries of CEE where 
most institutional change occurred were also those that most increased their trade with 
the EU. This paper also addresses reverse causality problem between trade and 
institutional variables. 
Do and Levchenko (2005) demonstrate that trade openness may be detrimental to 
institutional quality when the productivity of firms are differing between firms and it 
affects political power. Bad institutions increase “political power” of a small elite of 
large exporter who prefer to continue such institutions. 
Francois and Manchin (2013) empirically illustrate the joint impacts of institutions 
and infrastructure quality on trade. Low institutional quality and poor infrastructure of 
developing countries is determinant of trade flows. 
Levchenko (2007) explores countries with better institutions-quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, and shareholder protection- capture higher US import 
shares using institutions as a “source of trade”. 
 Ranjan and Lee (2007) focus on a particular aspect of institutions- enforcement of 
contract-and its impact on trade in different types of goods. Enforcement of contract 
has impact on international trade. 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) explore institutions-enforcement of contract and the 
corruption-impact on trade. They found that, “Lower institutional quality has a 
substantial negative effect on trade.” 
Given the emphasis on the quality of institutions as a determinant of international 
trade as well as economic development, it is perhaps surprising that trade policy and 
the quality of institutions have not been brought together in the empirical literature. 
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The objective of this research is to analyze both the indices together impact on growth 
and to investigate the change of institutions impact on trade in a decade. 
 
3. DEFINITION, CONCEPT AND RELATIONSHIP 
3.1 Institution 
The effects of good institutions on development have come to economic discourse 
from the last decades. Even today World Bank (WB) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) show great concern on institutional development. Not only these, United 
Nations and its body are providing importance of good governance i.e., good 
institutions. For example, during the 1997 Asian crisis, IMF put great emphasis on 
good corporate governance institutions and bankruptcy laws, while World Trade 
Organization (WTO)’s World Trade Report 2014 “Trade and development: recent 
trends and the role of the WTO” focuses on institutional development. However, the 
important question is the definition of institutions. 
The most widely used and concrete definition is given by North (1990, p.3) 
“Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that structure human interaction. As a consequence, they structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.” In the current 
orthodox literature of institution and development discussed “forms” and “functions” 
of institutions.  
Forms of institutions that they perform (e.g., independent judiciary system, 
democratic practice, the absence of state ownership) and the functions that they 
execute (e.g., rule of law, property rights, contract enforcement, maintenance of price 
stability, the restraint on corruption). This research focuses on some balance between 
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forms and functions in thinking about the role of institutions in economic 
development. 
3.2 Trade policy 
All countries require goods and services to satisfy demands of their citizens. Ample 
resources are required for production of goods and services in sufficient level. Each 
country has suffered inadequate resources or lacks of resources. Any country cannot 
produce all the goods and services according to it requirement or can produce less 
than its requirements. It has to buy from the rest of the country what it cannot produce 
according to its requirement. Similarly, it sells the goods which it has in excess 
quantities to other countries that have lacks of such products. In general, every 
country has to depend on another country. It has to buy goods which are either non-
available with it or are available in insufficient quantities to other countries through 
importing. Similarly, it can export goods, which are in excess quantity with it and are 
in high demand outside. This is well known as “international trade”. 
Trade policies mean the policies that various governments adopt toward international 
trade. These policies have many actions, strategies and instruments make it effective. 
Trade policies can be categorized on following way on the basis of taxes on imports 
or exports, quota, subsidies and many other policy tools:  
 tariffs and  
 non-tariff measures (NTMs).  
Governments usually apply different combinations of policies to diverse imported or 
exported products in a country.  
According to the WTO ‘trade policy’ means, “Rules for trade in goods, trade in 
services, and trade-related intellectual property rights. Trade policy included 
reduction or removal of obstacles to trade (import tariffs and non-tariff, other trade 
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barriers to trade) and agreeing on rules governing the conduct of international trade 
(e.g. anti-dumping, subsidies, product standards, etc.” WTO focused on open borders, 
the agreement of most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle and non-discriminatory 
treatment by and among member countries, and a commitment to transparency in the 
conduct of its activities through the guiding principles for its formation. 
3.3 Growth and trade 
National income accounting for a country can be expressed as: 
𝑌 ൌ 𝐶 ൅ 𝐼 ൅ 𝐺 ൅ 𝑋 െ 𝐼𝑀 
Where, Y=country’s output, C=household consumption expenditure, I=investment, 
G=government expenditure and X-M=the current-account balance, i.e. the difference 
between exports and imports. Each element on the right-hand side of the equation has 
two components, one of which is autonomous and the other a function of national 
income, which in turn equals output (Y). Export and import will be related to an 
export-oriented growth strategy, while the other three parameters will be related to a 
more domestic-demand-oriented growth strategy. 
Various economic growth models are supply-driven without paying much attention to 
the different parameters of national income accounting equation. Such models are 
supply-driven, with output growth being a function of factor inputs and factor 
productivity. Aggregate demand for output is assumed to be sufficient for full 
utilization of capacity. Trade is a one of the components of national income 
accounting equation that is an important parameter in supply-based growth analyses. 
Trade can be expressed as terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export prices to 
import prices), but more usually on the assumption that “trade openness” contributes 
to capital accumulation or productivity growth. Harrison and Rodriguez- Clare (2010) 
states, “Different studies measure openness differently: some through tariff rates or 
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non-tariff barriers, but most commonly as some ratio of trade flows to output”.  Using 
the knowledge of supply-based perspective, “export-oriented growth” means a high 
ratio of exports and imports relative to output ((X-M)/Y), i.e., being very open to trade. 
The national income accounting equation can be rearranged as: 
1 ൌ 𝐶𝑌 ൅
ሺ𝐼 ൅ 𝐺ሻ
𝑌 ൅
ሺ𝑋 െ 𝐼𝑀ሻ
𝑌  
ሺ𝑋 െ 𝐼𝑀ሻ
𝑌 ൌ 1 െ
𝐶
𝑌 െ
ሺ𝐼 ൅ 𝐺ሻ
𝑌  
Therefore, any given share of household consumption, investment and government 
consumption in output (i.e. C/Y, (I+G)/Y) is compatible with an unlimited range of 
values of trade openness (i.e. (X+M)/Y). A country can have a high share of 
consumption, investment and government consumption in output and still export most 
of its output. 
3.4 Relationship among three key concepts 
 
Figure 01: Trade, trade policy, growth and institution relationship 
Institutions have a key role in growth and to generate more trade which led to growth. 
Recent economic research and literature has highlighted the contribution of 
institutions in sustained GDP growth rate. Research and Development (R&D) as well 
as invest in human and physical capital depends on the firm’s incentive. This type of 
incentive can be ensured by the quality of institutions such as, contract enforcement, 
property rights, rule of law, etc. For example, a well-known argument for innovation 
is “New technologies provide market power and that firms’ investments in R&D are 
motivated by the prospect of higher future profits derived from this market power” 
Growth
Trade
Institution
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(Schumpeter, 1942). In this circumstance, technological development as well as 
subsequent GDP growth is determined by the proper implementation of property 
rights. Both Acemoglu (2008) and Helpman (2004) illustrated, “Since firms under-
invest in Research and Development when property rights are not enforced, 
economies with low institutional quality tends to grow more slowly than economies 
with higher institutional quality”. 
Trade liberalization also affects GDP growth. On the one side, trade liberalization 
allows a country to allocate resources based on comparative advantage which makes 
production more specialized and finally rises up GDP. On the other side, 
technological spill-over and institutional reform are mandatory to cope with trade 
sustains investment and innovation. This thing can be occurred on the platform of 
open economy and eventually accelerated faster growth.  
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Methodology 
In the econometric literature, three types of traditional growth regression have been 
used: panel data based on several period averages using lagged variables as 
Instrumental Variable (IV) regression; pure cross-country regression; and country 
specific regression. These analyses generally used OLS techniques and found static 
relationship. 
Based on the longitudinal data of 58 developing countries (World Bank 
Classification)1 from 1984 to 2014, this research, quantitative tests the impact of trade 
policy and institutions on growth. Instrumental Variable (IV) method has been used to 
get the result. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) growth regression: 
ሺ1ሻ𝑦௜௧ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝑦௜,௧ି௞ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝑥௜௧ ൅ 𝜂௜ ൅ 𝛾௧ ൅ 𝑣௜௧ 
                                                            
1 According to specification by the World Bank, “Developing countries are defined according to their 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita per year. Countries with a GNI of US$11,905 and less are 
defined as developing.” 
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Where 𝑦௜௧  is GDP growth rate of a country i at time t, 𝑦௜,௧ି௞  is lagged dependent 
variable, which is k years lag (k= 10 years decadal data using in this research) and 𝑥௜௧ 
is a set of control variables. Both trade volumes/tariff and parameters of institutional 
quality will treat under the variables in 𝑥. The conventional formula is to Subtract 
lagged GDP growth rate from both sides of the equation in which the dependent 
variable is the GDP growth rate, regressed on initial GDP growth rate and a set of 
control variables. The error term in this regression consists of constant unobserved 
country effect over time,𝜂௜, common unobserved time invariant effect across countries, 
𝛾௧ , and years and countries effects that two varies components are assumed to be 
uncorrelated over time, 𝑣௜௧. 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the specification means it is no 
longer possible to assume that all the covariates (i.e., the right-hand side variables in 
the equation) are independent with the disturbance term. The 𝑥௜ may remain strictly 
exogenous, but 𝑦௜,௧ି௞  cannot be exogenous in the presence of an unobserved 
component. The additive structure of the linear panel models means that we can 
eliminate the confounding influence of 𝜂௜  and 𝛾௧ by differencing or by the within–
transformation. Taking the first difference of the specification yields an estimating 
equation as: 
ሺ2ሻ𝑦௜௧ െ 𝑦௜,௧ି௞ ൌ 𝛽ଵ. ൫𝑦௜,௧ି௞ െ 𝑦௜,௧ିଶ௞൯ ൅ 𝛽ଶ൫𝑥௜௧ െ 𝑥௜,௧ି௞൯ ൅ ሺ𝛾௧ െ 𝛾௧ି௞ሻ ൅ ሺ𝑣௜௧ െ 𝑣௜,௧ି௞ሻ 
Differencing doesn’t completely solve the problem; it eliminates the time–invariant 
component, but ∆𝑦௜,௧ି௞ will be correlated with ∆𝑣௜௧.  
Here this research adopts the method of Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) to 
estimate the equation (1). Within-transformation of equations (1) using proper lags of 
the right-hand side variables of the equation as instruments. 
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This is just a regression of GDP growth rate on lagged GDP growth rate, and on 
changes in the set of independent variables. Or, subtracting lagged GDP growth rate 
from both sides of the equation, in this estimation changes in GDP growth rate from a 
decade to the next decade as a function of early decade GDP growth rate and changes 
in the independent variables. This method has several advantageous features of this 
research, and in particular helps to solve problems of measurement error, omitted 
variables, and reverse causality (endogeneity). 
The key identification assumption is that explanatory variables trade volumes and 
institutional quality can be correlated with the current and lagged shocks to GDP 
growth rate (E[Xitvi,t-s]≠for s≥0), they are uncorrelated with upcoming shocks to 
GDP growth rate, (E[Xitvi,t+s]=0 for s>0). In regression analysis, this means that when 
using regress growth rate in the 1994s on growth rate in the 1984s and the change in 
explanatory variables trade volumes and the change in institutions quality between the 
1984s and 1994s, it will be used the 5 year’s lag of  explanatory variables (trade 
volumes and institutions’ quality) in 1984s as an instrument. 
Specific model for capturing decadal institution’s change in effects on trade: 
(3) 𝑡𝑔𝑑𝑝തതതതതതത௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝑦ത௜,௧ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝑦ത௜,௧ି௞ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝚤𝑛𝑠തതതത௜,௧  ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑡𝑔𝑑𝑝௜,௞ ൅ 𝛼௜ ൅ 𝜆௧ ൅ 𝜀௜௧ 
where 𝑡𝑔𝑑𝑝തതതതതതത௜,௧  indicates the decadal average in trade value from year 1984 for country 
i at period t, 𝑦ത௜,௧ is average GDP growth rate value from year 1984 for country i at 
period t,  𝑦ത௜,௧ି௞ is lagged growth rate (k=10 years),  𝚤𝑛𝑠തതതത௜,௧, the variable of interest, 
indicates the improvement of institutional quality, which is average from year 1984 
for country i at period t,  𝑡𝑔𝑑𝑝௜,௞  stands for the percentage of trade to GDP, constant 
unobserved country effect over time, 𝛼௜, an unobserved time invariant effects that are 
common across countries, 𝜆௧ , and 𝜀௜௧  for the error term. The lagged-dependent 
variable is now correlated to the composite error term through the contemporaneous 
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terms in period t − k. Instrumental variables (IV) are required to address such problem. 
The method this research adopts is to apply average of the past values of the 
independent variables as instruments in the regression, which is lagged value. 
Since institution’s quality, trade volumes, and GDP growth rate are collinear in the 
cross-section analysis, therefore, an alternate step is to apply the relationship between 
changes over time in these variables. During observing data set, it is found that GDP 
growth rate, trade volumes, and institutional quality – do reveal some amount of 
variability over time. Among these three variables of interest trade percentage of GDP 
is more constant over time than GDP growth rate, but still found substantial variation. 
However, true institutional quality change occurs very slowly. 
4.2 Data description 
It is important that there is adequate variation found in institutional quality within 
countries over time, so that dynamic regression of changes in GDP growth rate of 
changes in trade volumes and changes in institutions are potentially useful to capture 
the partial effects of both these explanatory variables. International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) data have been used for this research as institutions’ data. According to 
ICRG methodology, the rating is done by providing points to a specific group of 
factors based on probable risk. These factors termed as “political risk components”. 
Any components can get lowest point zero on the scale, while the highest point is 
related to fixed weight that any component can get into the overall political risk 
assessment. This rating pattern illustrated that lower the risk point in total considered 
the higher the risk, and the higher the risk point in total considered the lower the risk. 
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Table 01: ICRG institutional components. 
No. ICRG Components Components points 
1 Government Stability 12 
2 Investment Profile 12 
3 Democratic Accountability 6 
4 External Conflict 12 
5 Law and Order 6 
Source: ICRG, 2015 
These components have been chosen for the following reasons: 
4.2.1 Government stability  
Government stability has two parts: election manifesto and the possibility of 
continuing its office tenure. The ICRG rating consists of three underlying components 
such as government unity, legislative strength and popular support. Each component 
has a score of four points to 0 point scale. Very Low Risk means 4 points while Very 
High Risk means 0 points. 
4.2.2 Investment profile  
Investment profile also organized by three components such as, contract 
viability/expropriation, profit repatriation and payment delays. Each component has a 
score of four points to 0 point scale. Very Low Risk means 4 points while Very High 
Risk means 0 points. 
4.2.3 Democratic accountability 
This measure actually depends on the responsiveness of government to its people. On 
this basis, it seems that less responsive government more likely to fall, peacefully in a 
democratic society, but probably violently in a non-democratic society. 
4.2.4 External conflict 
The external conflict is the measurement of two elements: 
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1. foreign action from the different incumbent government, which is non-violent 
nature such as, diplomatic pressure, refuse to give aid, trade limits, territorial 
clash, sanctions, etc. 
2. violent external activities such as, cross-country border conflicts, war, etc. 
This type of activities may hamper trade and investment activities in different ways, 
limits trade activities and investment sanctions which are ultimate disallow efficient 
allocation of economic resources as well as an aggressive change in the structure in 
the society. The risk rating is provided based on summation of three sub-components; 
each component has scored on four points to 0 point scale. A score of 4 points reflects 
to “Very Low Risk” and a score of 0 points equates to “Very High Risk”. The sub-
components are following: 
 war 
 cross-border conflict 
 foreign pressures 
4.2.5 Law and Order 
“Law and Order” are a single component, but it has two elements which are assessed 
separately. Each element is being scored from zero to three point scale. To assess the 
“Law” element, the strength and fairness of the legal system are taking into account, 
while the “Order” element is an assessment of popular execution of the law. 
4.2.6 Trade volume as a proxy of trade policies 
There are not available cross-country data for overall trade policy. The most 
demanding indices (average tariff rates or non-tariff barrier coverage ratios data) have 
clear disadvantages. If anybody uses simple averages of tariff rates for different goods, 
it is likely to give undue weight to categories of insignificant goods for a country. If, 
in contrast, anyone averages imports weighting, then the effects of prohibitive tariffs 
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which stifle all imports are lost. In view of non-tariff barriers (NTB), the best 
obtainable data simply report the number of tariff lines on which a few would be 
easily identifiable NTBs is in effect. Pritchett (1996) described that this NTBs data 
were not provided any information about connection of such barriers, and surely 
eliminates a wide range of less-easily quantifiable barriers to trade, such as local 
procurement requirements. This procedure created important gaps between statutory 
rates and collected tariffs, due to lacks of tariff enforcement and legal exemption or 
corruption practice in custom administration. These limitations make obstacle to 
measure trade policy as explanatory variables. 
4.2.7 Variables and country coverage for regression 
58 developing countries (appendix A) 1984-2014 year panel unbalanced data have 
been used to analyze the regression model. Table 2 shows the list of variables and 
data source used in this regression model. 
Table 02: Variables name and data source. 
Variables Data Source 
GDP growth rate World Bank Databank 
Trade percentage of GDP World Bank Databank 
Government Stability International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Invest profile International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
External conflict International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Law and order International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Democratic accountability International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Gross capital World Bank Databank, IMF and Penn World Tables 8.0 
Households consumption World Bank Databank, IMF and Penn World Tables 8.0 
Government consumption World Bank Databank, IMF and Penn World Tables 8.0 
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4.2.8 Summary statistics 
The following table describes the summary of the variables used IV regression for 
analysis. Summary statistics like mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
are included. 
 Table 03: Summary Statistics of Variables. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP growth rate 1797 3.934916 4.534387 -29.589 33.73578
Trade percentage of GDP 1796 65.41714 33.89394 10.74832 220.4074
Government Stability 1782 7.333162 2.167571 1 12 
Investment profile 1782 6.641267 2.03267 0 11.5 
External conflict 1782 9.388853 1.977071 2 12 
Law and order 1782 2.90064 1.102992 0 6 
Democratic 
accountability 
1782 3.345726 1.354739 0 6 
Gross capital percentage 
of GDP 
1796 21.69345 8.353389 -2.424358 63.85266
Households consumption 
percentage of GDP 
1793 69.87204 14.45671 1.511768 152.1419
Government consumption 
percentage of GDP 
1793 13.64964 5.75595 2.047121 86.90555
The above table clearly describes the mean growth rate of the developing countries is 
3.94%. Institution variables government stability mean is 7.33 and the standard 
deviation is 2.17. This implies that there is huge variation in this data between 
countries. Investment profile also has a big difference between mean and standard 
deviation.
17 
 
Table 04: Regression result. 
Dependent variable: decadal average GDP growth rate 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)          (7)          (8)    
                 OLS          IV           OLS          IV           OLS          IV           OLS          IV    
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
lgdpgr          0.21***     ‐0.08*        0.21***     ‐0.17**       0.21***     ‐0.12**       0.21***     ‐0.03    
              (7.69)      (‐2.47)       (7.50)      (‐3.16)       (7.51)      (‐3.20)       (7.54)      (‐0.65)    
 
trade          ‐0.01***      0.01        ‐0.01***      0.05**      ‐0.01***     ‐0.01        ‐0.01***     ‐0.01    
             (‐5.99)       (0.81)      (‐6.19)       (2.75)      (‐6.29)      (‐0.66)      (‐6.08)      (‐0.64)    
 
governme~y                                0.08**       0.97***                                                     
                                        (2.79)       (3.97)                                                        
 
inv_prof~e                                                          0.03         0.64***                           
                                                                  (1.14)       (3.55)                              
 
democrat~y                                                                                   ‐0.01         0.99*** 
                                                                                           (‐0.36)       (4.21)    
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
N               1160         1160         1160         1160         1160         1160         1160         1160    
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
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Table 04: Regression result (continue). 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
                (9)          (10)         (11)         (12)    
                OLS           IV          OLS           IV    
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
lgdpgr          0.22***     ‐0.23         0.19***     ‐0.21    
              (8.16)      (‐1.41)       (6.99)      (‐1.42)    
 
trade          ‐0.01***      0.06        ‐0.01***      0.11    
             (‐5.24)       (1.06)      (‐6.23)       (1.03)    
 
exter_conf     ‐0.13**       0.92                              
             (‐3.12)       (1.02)                              
 
law_order                                 0.25***      1.84    
                                        (4.62)       (0.88)    
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
N               1160         1160         1160         1160    
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
t statistics in parentheses, estimated with robust standard errors. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Instruments: Five years lagged levels of trade percentage of GDP, and institutional quality 
(government stability, investment profile, democratic accountability, external conflicts and law 
& order) 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In the first column of the Table 4 represent the results, simply estimating Equation (2) 
by OLS. While this estimation method is inconsistent, it is a helpful way of 
summarizing the partial correlations in the data. It has been reported the estimated 
coefficients, and t-statistics in parentheses computed with robust standard errors and 
found robust to heteroskedasticity. The first-order serial correlation in the residuals is 
stimulated by differencing. The remarkable feature of this first column in regression 
result is that trade volumes are negative correlation with changes in GDP growth rate, 
with an estimated coefficient of 0.01 and a t-statistic more than 3 at the 1% level of 
significance. This result is not in line with expectation and real situation.  
In the second column of the IV regression results, instrument for trade volumes is 
used to capture the exact condition. The coefficient on trade volumes changes to 
positive correlation and remains insignificant to 0.01. The magnitude of its coefficient 
shows that ceteris paribus, if 1% increases in the trade share to GDP, it will raise the 
growth rate by 0.01 percentage point over a decade. The coefficient on lagged growth 
has the expected negative sign (-0.08), and is significant at the 10% level of 
significance. The negative magnitude of lagged growth is consistent with the 
convergence to steady states. The insignificant effects of trade measures support this 
view. After the recession of 2007, it is revealed that the growth rate of developing 
countries is slowing down as well as international trade. 
Next result is the partial effects of trade volume and institutions’ quality in this 
dynamic regression framework. In the rest of the columns of Table 4 show each of the 
five time-varying indicators of institutional quality discussed above, and appropriate 
lag for each is used as an instrument. With government stability (columns 3-4), this 
institutional measure is significant in the OLS, but trade is negatively correlated and 
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significant. In IV regression both are positive and significant. The point estimates 
indicate that a 1 point improvement in government stability leads to 0.97 percentage 
points rise in growth rate in a decade at 1% level of significance. Trade is significant 
at conventional 5% level of significance and the magnitude is 0.05 that means a 1% 
increase in trade, share will rise growth rate 0.05 percentage points over a decade. 
Investment profile is insignificant and trade variable is negatively significant with 
growth rate in OLS. But investment profile is positive and significant in IV regression 
while trade is negatively correlated and insignificant with growth rate. The apparent 
negative impact of trade on growth rate may be due to measurement inaccuracies of 
other growth components. The possible implication for this negative sign might be 
that other components of growth equation are not impacted enough on growth rate. 
However, the point estimates specify that a 1 point rise in the investment profile 
would have the effect of increasing growth rate by 0.64 percentage point over a 
decade.  
Democratic accountability is insignificant whereas trade is negatively correlated and 
significant in OLS. However, in IV regression indicates that the 1 point rise in the 
democratic accountability would have the effect of increasing growth rate by 0.99 
percentage point over a decade and highly significant. Trade is negative and 
insignificant. 
External conflict is negative and significant in OLS while it is positive in IV 
regression but not significant. Law and order are positive and significant in OLS but 
positive and insignificant in IV regression.  In both circumstances, trade is negative 
and significant in OLS. However, trade is positive and insignificant in IV regression 
in both cases. 
21 
 
Institutional variables are repeatedly tested with trade variables in this IV regression. 
The concept behind this approach is to identify the partial out the effects of different 
institutional variables because of institutional variables are persistence over decades. 
If all of the variables are persistent and tested at a time, then the dynamic analysis is 
not going to add much. However, the variable of interest- growth, trade, and 
institutional quality-do exhibit variability over time which can be seen from next 
figures. 
 
Figure 02: Persistence of growth rate in decades 1995s and 2005s. 
The Figure 2 shows the relationship between 1995s growth rate and 2005s growth rate. 
Half of the countries are underneath the 450 line (slower growth in the 2005s than the 
1995s). Conversely, the countries above the line is a significant cluster of countries, 
including China, Mongolia, India, and Bangladesh in Asia; Ghana, Sierra Leone, and 
Ethiopia in Africa; and Ecuador and Peru in Latin America. 
Trade as a percentage of GDP is more constant than GDP growth rate, but still 
displays substantial variation over decades. The Figure 3 explains this. There are 
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some countries such as Vietnam that has seen a more than a 50 percentage-points 
increase, and other developing countries have found significant trade growth as well. 
Still, several developing countries trade volume a lesser amount of their GDP today 
than 20 years ago. 
 
Figure 03: Trade percentage of GDP in decades 1995s and 2005s 
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Figure 04: Persistence of government stability in decades 1995s and 2005s. 
 
Figure 05: Persistence of investment profile in decades 1995s and 2005s. 
 
ALB
ALGBGD
BOL
BWA
BRA
BUL
BFA
CMR
CHN
COL
COG
ZAR
CRI
CIV
CUBDOM
ECU
EGY
SLV
ETH
GAB
GMB
GHA
GTM
GNB
HNDIND IDN
JOR
KEN
MDG
MWI
MYS
MLI
MEX MNG
MAR
MOZ
NIC
NERNGA
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
SEN
SLE
ZAFLKA
THA
TUN
TUR
UGA
SDN
TGO
VNM
ZWE
6
7
8
9
10
11
Go
ve
rnm
en
t s
tab
ility
 20
05
s
6 7 8 9 10 11Government stability 1995s
ALB ALG
BGD
BOL
BWA
BRA
BUL
BFACMR
CHN
COLCOG
ZAR
CRI
CIV
CUB
DOM
ECU
EGY
SLV
ETH
GABGMBGHA
GTM
GNB HND
INDIDN
JOR
KEN
MDG MWI
MYS
MLI
MEX
N
MAR
MOZNIC
NER
NGA
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
SEN
SLE
ZAF
LKATHA TUNTUR
UGA
SDN TGO
VNM
ZWE
2
4
6
8
10
12
Inv
es
tm
en
t p
rof
ile
 20
05
s
2 4 6 8 10 12Investment profile 1995s
24 
 
 
Figure 06: Persistence of democratic accountability in decades 1995s and 2005s. 
Figure 4, 5 and 6 identifies each of the three significant measures of institutional 
quality in the 1995s against its corresponding value in the 2005s, depending on data 
availability. One explanation of this is that true institutional change occurs very 
slowly. 
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Figure 07: Effect of Trade on Growth 
Figure 7 reports scatter between average trade volumes and average GDP growth rate 
corresponding to this instrumented regression, and confirm that there are two outliers 
China and Vietnam. The results are not changed much by such obvious outliers in the 
data.  It is obvious that the result remains quite robust. 
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Table 05: Regression result. 
Dependent variable: decadal average trade  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
lgdpgr               0.97***         0.79***         1.00***         0.94***         0.98*** 
                   (5.56)          (4.49)          (5.96)          (5.08)          (5.67)    
 
trade                0.49***         0.48***         0.49***         0.49***         0.49*** 
                  (18.88)         (19.19)         (18.41)         (18.87)         (17.73)    
 
avg_gdpgr            0.51**          0.23            0.25            0.48*           0.46*   
                   (2.62)          (1.18)          (1.16)          (2.47)          (2.37)    
 
avg_govs             0.99*                                                                   
                   (2.00)                                                                    
 
avg_invst                            1.58***                                                 
                                   (4.00)                                                    
 
avg_democ                                            1.41*                                   
                                                   (2.01)                                    
 
avg_extconf                                                          0.81                    
                                                                   (1.13)                    
 
avg_lawo                                                                            -1.05    
                                                                                  (-1.14)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                    1160            1160            1160            1160            1160    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses, estimated with robust standard errors. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Instruments: Lagged levels of institutional quality (average value of government stability, investment profile, democratic 
accountability, external conflicts and law & order). 
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The IV regression for institutional variables impacts on decadal trade average present 
pretty fine (Table 5). There is a positive correlation between initial levels of trade 
volumes and subsequent growth in trade. Lagged decadal average growth rate also has 
positive and significant effects on decadal trade average. Decadal average growth rate 
is a control variable in this IV regression. 
Adding institutional quality to the regression, it is found that government stability has 
a positive and significant effect on trade. 1 score improvement in government stability 
rises to trade 0.99 percentage points over a decade at 10% level of significance.  
Investment profile has positive and significant effects on trade. 1 point improvement 
in this institutional quality would increase trade 1.58 percentage points over a decade 
at 1% level of significance.  
Democratic accountability has positive and significant effects on trade. Trade would 
grow 1.41 percentage points over a decade at 10% level of significance through 
improving 1 point in democratic accountability. Other two institutional measurements 
have no significant effects on trade over a decade. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
This paper has analyzed different studies that examined the impact of trade policy and 
institutional quality on growth. To recognize the partial effects of trade and 
institutional quality, this research has conducted regression analyses to assess the 
effects of trade policy and institutional quality on growth and empirically found that 
trade policy and institutional quality may have a positive and significant effect on 
growth for developing countries. In cross-sectional results, it is found that a 
substantial partial effect of changes in trade shares in predicting changes in growth 
rates considerate to change in measures of institutions plays a smaller role. However, 
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IV regression showed that trade shares and measures of institutional quality vary 
substantially as well. 
Moreover, this research conducted a regression analysis to capture the decadal change 
of institutional quality impact on trade which supposed to be affected on growth. Even 
though the institutional capacity aims to improve the trade shares of developing 
countries, institutional capacity may not be an easy solution for developing countries 
with bad institutional quality as well as the slow progress in institutional quality 
improvement. 
The present study also suggests several policy implications. First, the explicit aim of 
policy makers should be to improve institutional quality without looking interest of 
vested groups.  
Second, having institutional quality, long-run association with trade and economic 
growth, it provides an alternative policy option for achieving the aim of sustainable 
long-run economic growth for developing countries. 
Third, the study suggests that developing countries should emphasize on trade based 
on comparative advantage and move from trade of traditional sectors to value-added 
manufacturing sectors for economic growth. 
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APPENDIX A 
1. Country Coverage of Data Set 
Albania 
Algeria 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cuba 
Dominican 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Sudan 
Togo 
Vietnam 
Zimbabwe 
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